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The conflict of interest is a very 
common concept arising in a 
multiplicity of contexts in business 
life where:
"... two or more interests are 
legitimately present and competing or 
conflicting, while the individual making a 
decision that will affect those interests may 
have a larger stake in one of them than 
in other(s)'.
(Schotland Roy, Introduction to the 
Twentieth Century Fund Steering 
Committee on Conflicts of Interest in 
the Securities Markets, Abuse on Wall 
Street: Conflicts of Interest in the Securities 
Markets, Westport, Conn., Quorum 
Books, 1980, at 5).
The concept of conflict of interest, 
or conflict of duties, has also been 
approached as one arising:
' ...whenever one is serving two or more 
interests and can put one person in a 
better position at the expense of another'.
(FR Eswards, 'Banks and Securities 
Activities: Legal and Economic 
Perspectives on The Glass-Steagall 
Act', in LG Goldberg and LT White 
(eds), The Deregulation of the Banking 
and Securities Industries, Lexington, 
Toronto, 1980, at 282.)
These definitions are structured on 
the basis of two elements: on the one 
hand, the existence and conflict of 
two or more competing interests and, 
on the other, the position (and the 
dilemma) of a person whose duty it is 
to balance these interests and finally 
resolve their conflict by promoting 
only one of them at the expense of 
the others. Given that the decision on 
which interest to promote is one 
resting upon the discretionary power 
of one sole person and his own 
personal integrity and criteria, one 
might reasonably expect such a 
decision not to be perfectly impartial, 
"but to some extent influenced by the
person's own preferences and 
interests. Furthermore, at this point 
we may introduce the third: 
the additional parameter of 
interdependence of interests   the 
factor which may affect in a 
determinative way the deciding 
person's discretion and, hence, the 
very resolution of the conflict itself.
EQUITY AND CONFLICT: 
BASIC RULES
The framework of rules applying to 
the problem of conflicts of interest 
and their resolution was built on the 
basis of the rules governing theo o
nature and operation of the fiduciary 
relationship. The rules on fiduciaries 
and fiduciary obligations have evolved 
through time, starting from a general 
catch-all duty of the fiduciary to act 
in the best interests of the beneficiary 
and developed to a framework of 
prohibitive rules which stipulate the 
actions which fiduciaries cannot take, 
the factors by which the fiduciaries 
cannot be influenced and the results 
that the fiduciaries' actions cannot 
have.
This was named 'the prescriptive 
orthodoxy of Anglo-Australian 
fiduciary law' (John Glover, 
Commercial Equity: Fiduciary Relations, 
Butterworths, Adelaide, 1995, at 2), 
and was summarised by Lord 
Herschell in 1896 as:
' ... [one] inflexible rule of a Court of 
Equity: that a person in ajiduciary position 
... is not, unless otherwise expressly 
provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not 
allowed to put himself in a position where 
his duty and interest conflict.' (Bray v Ford 
[1986] AC 44 at 57)
In a long series of court decisionso
this fundamental prescriptive 
approach was repeated and analysed 
on many occasions and in various 
wordings and formulations, such as:
' ... Jully informed consent apart, an 
agent cannot lawfully place himself in a 
position in which he owes a duty to another 
which is inconsistent with his duty to the 
principal...' (North &^South Trust Co v 
Berkeley [1971] 1 WLR 470 at 484)
and
' ... the duty of ajiduciary is twofold: Jirst 
where he has undertaken to actjor or on 
behalf of another, he must refrain Jrom 
letting any personal interest sway him Jrom 
the proper performance of his undertaking; 
second, he must not misuse the position of 
trust his undertaking gives him tojurther 
his own interests. He must not profit from 
his own position of trust'. (Standard 
Investments Ltd v Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce (1893) d DLR (4th) 
452 at 481, Griffiths] (Ont. CA))
Thus, the content of the fiduciary 
obligation is clarified on the basis of 
two fundamental prohibitions: the 
'no-profit and no-conflict' rules.
WHY ARE CONFLICTS SO 
COMPLEX AND ACUTE?
The intense pressures of 
competition have led the key players 
in the world of financial services   
such as commercial and investment 
banks, accounting and consulting
' O O
firms   to a rapid process of 
restructuring or in the direction of 
offering an ever wider variety of more 
complicated and more 'profitable' 
financial products and services.
This restructuring process is 
basically characterised by a qualitative 
and a quantitative dimension, i.e. 
a tendency for growth in seize 
through consolidation, as well as 
diversification, in the nature of 
services offered through the 
combination of various financial 
functions offering various products.
The aim of consolidation is, on the 
one hand, to cut down the operating
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costs of the industry and create 
economies of scale, and, on the other, 
to create competitive advantages by 
enlarging as much as possible a firm's 
clientele   which means both a wider 
target market for cross-selling, but 
also a wider spectrum of information 
possessed by one single firm about 
market conditions and prospects 
(which in the financial market 
means better quality). Similarly, 
diversification aims to exploit the 
obvious market advantages of 
concentrating and offering the widest 
possible range of products and 
services in one single financial 
conglomerate (the so-called 'financial 
supermarket' or 'money mall').
The effects of these tendencies 
have made a rapid appearance in the 
sector. After a strong wave of mergers 
and acquisitions leading to 
consolidation in the investment 
banking industry, the global market 
for financial services is today 
dominated by a small number of large 
international investment banks. At 
the same time, the larger the firms 
get, the wider the variety of serviceso ' J
they offer.
In the absence of restrictive 
regulation in countries such as the 
UK and Germany, the dominating 
model is that of the universal bank 
providing all kinds of services, 
ranging from retail and corporate 
banking, to investment banking, 
corporate finance services, 
investment advice, asset 
management, operation of unit trusts 
and mutual funds, and even insurance 
services. The fact that the Financial
Services and Markets Bill envisages 
the creation of one single regulatory 
authority (FSA) supervising all those 
different sectors is indeed the virtual 
endorsement of today's universal 
bank model reality.
On the other hand, in the US the 
Glass-Steagall Act has for almost a 
century imposed strict barriers to the 
approach of the functions of 
commercial banking, investmento7
banking and insurance. However, for 
years a strong tendency towards 
adopting the universal bank model 
has rapidly grown in the US, which
gradually challenged the GlaSS- fe J o
Steagall Act and finally led to its 
virtual abolition in November 1999 
by the Gramm-Leach- 
Bliley Act, which 
permitted the affiliation of 
banks with securities firms 
and insurance companies, 
expanded the activities 
permissible to bank 
affiliates to 'those financial 
in nature', authorised 
merchant bank 
investments in non- 
financial business and 
reduced the Federal 
Reserve supervision over 
an entire organisation by relying in 
part on functional supervision.
The inevitable effects of 
consolidation and diversification are 
more conflicts and more complicated 
conflicts: in fact, in very broad terms, 
consolidation and larger client base 
means more dutv-to-dutv conflicts 
and diversification usually means more 
self-interest-to-duty conflicts.
TYPES OF CONFLICT IN 
CONGLOMERATES
A general overview of the types of 
conflict which may arise within 
today's financial conglomerates 
identifies four basic groups on the 
basis of the form in which they are 
structured. Thus one may identify 
conflicts relating to:
  the fair execution of clients' trading 
orders (a heavily regulated area; the 
Core Conduct of Business Rules
provide a detailed framework for 
addressing the problems and I 
believe that the new rules currently 
being drafted will be even more 
efficient);
  the management, transfer and fair 
allocation of risk between various 
functions of a conglomerate (i.e.o \
support of a failed securities 
offering by either the trust 
management branch (through 
stock purchases) or by the 
commercial banking arm of the 
same firm through imprudent debt 
financing of the issuer);o ' 7
  conflicts arising in situations of 
economic dependence and 
influence (such as economic tie-ins 
and interlocking directorships); 
and
'informational 
and internal
  the so-called 
advantageso
management of information' 
conflicts (which I consider the 
most acute and interesting and on 
which I have chosen to focus the 
rest of my analysis).
In this latter case, the basic conflict 
is structured in two stages: the 
acquisition of 'sensitive' information 
and the management ando
transmission of such. Within a 
financial conglomerate, there are 
various sources for the acquisition of 
information. Investment bankers 
acquire inside information through 
underwriting, financial restructuring,O7 O7
mergers and acquisitions;
<T<?lt'i*X'*<?2-<~2^J t^.->r->ir^fi- .->f^f?t}JJ-t^
information through the due 
diligence necessary for the provision 
of debt financing; generally, a 
financial conglomerate can gain 
access to a company's secrets through 
various other ways, such as the 
appointment of members on its 
board of directors, etc. In cases such 
as the above, the information is 
usually acquired within the limits of a 
fiduciary relationship and is thus 
confidential.
The second stage is the 
management of this information, 
which generally has a price-sensitive 21
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character and thus a wealth 
generating potential.
Such information may be 
transmitted throughout theo
conglomerate to its trust department 
or trading department, where the 
firm's traders may transform the 
informational advantage into ao
pecuniary benefit for the 
conglomerate itself, or its investor-o '
clients. I will not deal with any issues 
of insider trading that arise in this 
context.
THE CHINESE WALL
The basic structural means that 
modern financial conglomerates have 
adopted to manage conflicts of 
informational advantages is theo
Chinese wall, a metaphor describing a 
set of rules, regulations, procedures 
and physical arrangements adopted 
by a firm in order to prevent 
confidential information from 
flowing from one of its departments 
to the other (see Larry Yarn, 'The 
Multi-service Securities Firm and the 
Chinese Wall: A New Look in the 
Light of the Federal Securities Code', 
63 Nebr L Rev 197, at 210), thus 
minimising the risk of abuse of this 
information for the benefit of the 
firm itself or of other clients who 
should not be allowed to access it.
A Chinese wall is usually set up in 
order to separate information-source 
departments (investment and 
commercial banking and, possibly, 
the specialist department) from those 
which can convert the information 
into a financial benefit for the firm or 
its clients, such as the securities 
trading or the trust department. Thus 
the wall is an internal device, 
operating within the structure and 
hierarchy of a firm and affecting 
virtually only its internal operations.
In general the wall is considered as 
serving a prophylactic function, in 
the sense that it prevents the 
interdepartmental flow of 
information within the firm. 
However, its wide adoption in the 
industry, combined with its
encouragement and endorsement by 
the regulators in the UK and the US, 
have led to a more sensitive question: 
whether the wall may also serve as a 
means towards a legal purpose, that 
of providing an ex post facto defence 
for a firm against incurring liabilityo o J
for insider trading or breach ofo
contractual or mainly fiduciary duties 
to a client from whom the 
confidential information was 
acquired. (See Norman Poser, 
'Chinese Wall or Emperor's New 
Clothes?', (1988) 9 Co Law 119.)
However, the issue of the efficiency 
of the wall as a legal defence iso
inevitably linked with the legal issue 
of attribution of corporate 
knowledge, and in particular whether 
an efficient wall can shield the firm 
from attribution of knowledge to it aso
a whole, in case a piece of material 
confidential information is held 
isolated in one department of the 
firm, without being communicated to7 o
others (see the Law Commission 
Consultation Paper No. 124, 
'Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory 
Rules ('LCCP No. 124'), para. 4.5.1, 
at 138). The premise of such a 
rationale is based on the concept that 
the adoption of adequate procedures 
of internal control over the access to 
material non-public information will 
be an efficient means of preventing 
the abuse of such information and 
reducing problems of conflicts of
O 1
interest. (See Edward Herlihy, 
'Insider Trading and Chinese Walls: Iso
There a Need for Reform?', (1987) 
561, PLI/Corp 727, (PLI Order No. 
B4-6791); also Roy, above, at 212).
THE REGULATORY 
POSITION
I shall try to address briefly the 
regulatory position as at this moment 
of transition by looking at the old 
Conduct of Business Rules, with the 
reminder that the Financial Services 
and Markets Bill is intended to 
replace the current FSA 1986 during 
2000/2001 (having now received 
Royal Assent on 14 June) and new 
regulatory rules are expected to be
introduced by the Financial Services 
Authority and to replace the Core 
Rules.
Indeed, General Principle 6 states 
that a firm should either avoid any 
conflict of interest arising, or should 
ensure 'fair treatment for all its 
customers by disclosure, internal 
rules of confidentiality, declining to 
act or otherwise', as well as that the 
firm should not unfairly place its 
interests above those of its customers, 
especially where a properly informed 
customer would not expect it to do 
so. Apparently 'internal rules of 
confidentiality' refer to Chinese wall 
policies. In the same spirit, Core Rule 
2 prohibits a firm from knowingly 
entering a conflict of interesto
situation in relation to a transaction, 
by either advising or dealing, unless 
the firm takes reasonable steps to 
ensure fair treatment for the 
customer. Thus, a firm may either 
take measures to prevent a conflict 
situation from arising, or deal with 
the conflict by adopting the 
appropriate measures for ensuring 
that its customers are fairly treated.
Rule 36 of the RSA's Conduct of 
Business Rules actually endorses the 
Chinese wall as a measure affording 
protection to a firm without the need 
to obtain the customer's consent 
where information has not crossed 
the wall.
The first paragraph of the rule 
permits the withholding of 
information obtained by one part of 
the firm from the persons with whom 
it deals (clients) in the course of 
carrying out another part of its 
business, as well as those of its 
employees who are dealing with the 
same clients in the other part of the 
firm's business, as long as such parts 
involve investment or related business. 
In addition, in its second paragraph, 
the rule confirms the same rule of 
isolation of information among 
different associates of a business 
group, reiterating that what is known 
to one company in a group may not be 
transmitted to other companies of the 
same group despite any obligations
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imposed by other Core Rules, as long 
as a Chinese wall policy is in operation 
(see Michael Blair, Financial Services: The 
New Core Rules, (Blackstone, London 
1991) at 138).
The third and fourth paragraphs to 
the rule have a supplemental function 
to the main provisions of the first two 
paragraphs. Thus, the fourth 
paragraph reiterates the protection 
offered to a firm that has adopted a 
Chinese wall scheme in accordance 
with the Core Rules against the 
potential imposition of liability by the 
anti-fraud provision of s. 47 of the 
Financial Services Act, mainly 
operating as an explanation to 
s. 48(6) of the Act.
At the same time, the third 
paragraph confirms the protection 
afforded to a firm that has adopted a 
Chinese wall, by addressing the 
problem of attribution of knowledge, 
in relation to other Conduct of 
Business Rules, the application of 
which depends upon knowledge on 
the part of the firm, and it does so 
through the introduction of a 
presumption that the firm will not be 
taken to act in knowledge when none 
of its employees involved on behalf of 
it acts with knowledge.
According to the Law Commissiono
Consultation Paper on Fiduciary 
Duties and Regulatory Rules (LCCP 
No. 124, para. 4.5.13, at 152), Rule 
36 relieves a firm which operates an 
'established arrangement' in 
compliance with it from the 
obligation of acquiring the customer's 
consent for the operation of such.
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND 
MARKETS BILL
From the early stages of the 
consultation process it was clarified 
in the draft documentation (see 
'Financial Servies and Markets Bill: A 
Consultation Document, Part One: 
Overview of Financial Regulatory 
Reform', para. 5.11) that:
'[the Bill] will ensure that compliance 
with FSA rules relating to Chinese walls 
which manage or avoid conflicts of interest
and help prevent insider dealing, will 
protect ajirm not only against criminal 
liability, but also civil action Jor breach of 
duty. This will mean thatjirms are not 
put in risk of legal challenge where they 
comply with these important regulatory 
requirements.'
The FSA expressed its intention to 
address the issue of regulatory 
endorsement of Chinese walls in the 
context of Consultation Paper No. 10 
dealing with the issue of the drafting 
of a new Code of Market Conduct. In 
particular, it is stated that:
'in order to ensure that knowledge of 
the employees is not imputed 
inappropriately to the companyJor the 
purpose of statutory provisions, thejirm is 
presumed not to be in possession of the 
information Jbr the purposes of its dealing 
if it can meet two tests: Jirst, that at all 
material times effective arrangements were 
in operation to prevent such information 
that is in the possession of any other 
personnel within the firm from influencing 
thejirm's decision to deal with investments 
and secondly, that 
the relevant 
information was not 
injact known by any 
of thejirm's personnel 
who were concerned in 
the decision to deal.' 
(s. 123)
wall and the views they have adopted 
on the main issues of interest, namely 
the issue of attribution of corporate 
knowledge to various departments of 
a firm and, in particular:
  whether it can be admitted from a 
dogmatic point of view that the 
Chinese wall can actually cause a 
crack in the traditional concept of 
one single corporate knowledge, 
based on the attribution to one 
corporate mind of the knowledge 
held by all the various departments 
of a firm;
  the adequacy of the Chinese wall as 
an arrangement which can 
efficiently stem the 
interdepartmental flow of 
confidential information within the 
context of a given establishment, 
such as an investment bank, a law 
firm or an accountancy firm; and
  the efficiency of the Chinese wall as 
a legal defence to actions for breach 
of contractual or fiduciary duties.
o n t h e i n
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Summaries and full texts of the Law Commission's consultation 
papers are available on this site.
Furthermore, it is also made clear 
that the Chinese wall arrangements 
should be designed not only to seek 
to prevent the passage of information 
but in order to detect when there 
may have been a breach and to 
remedy any breach to the extent 
possible. Finally, in view of the fact 
that it is impracticable for firms to 
raise Chinese walls within their 
trading departments between every 
trader, it is suggested that other 
methods of demonstrating effective 
control of information would be 
necessary and might involve firms in
J O
setting up new systems to evidence 
information control.
THE COURTS' APPROACH
We shall now examine the 
approach of courts to the Chinese
The issue of corporate knowledge
The traditional case law concept of 
attribution of knowledge to theo
corporate entity is based on the 
notion that a corporation has one 
single mind to which any knowledge 
possessed by all its departments, 
branches or employees is attributed. 
Thus, this abstract single corporate 
mind knows and possesses any 
information in any part of the firm, 
however large the firm or however 
detailed or complex the information 
may be. Such an approach apparently 
has significant consequences for the 
issue of attribution of liability to a 
company on the basis of knowledge 
of certain facts for establishing fraud 
or negligence.
In the context of financial services, 
a unified mind of an investment bank
23
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will be deemed to possess all 
confidential information possessed 
by its underwriting branch, its 
specialist branch as well as its M&A 
branch. Thus, the investment 
management or the brokers and 
dealers branch of an investment bank 
will be legally considered as being in 
possession of any confidential 
information disclosed, i.e. to the 
employees of the corporate finance 
department doing a due diligence1 o o
exercise in a company before the 
public offering of its securities.
I O
A look at the case law on the matter 
of attribution of knowledge shows theo
reluctance of courts to acknowledge 
any concept that would deviate from 
the notion of the single ando
indivisible corporate knowledge. 
Thus judges had refused to regardJo o
separate corporate departments as 
two separate entities, either insisting 
that:
'one company is one person in law, 
however [many] businesses they may carry 
on' (Harrods Ltd v Lemon [193 1] 2 KB 
157),
or holding that:o
'a company could not claim to have 
split up its knowledge' (Lloyds Bank Ltd v 
EB Savory S^Co [1933] AC 201),
or concluding that:o
'even when a company has [been] 
deemed to have more than one directing 
mind in the same field of operations, the 
knowledge, acts and intention of two or 
more directing minds should be 
attributable in total to the corporation' 
(Standard Investments Ltd v Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce (1986) 22 
DLR(4th) 410).
The above decisions were of course 
formulated in the context of 
companies which did not operate a 
Chinese wall establishment.
However, more recent cases such as 
El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings pic 
([1993] 3 All ER 717 (MillettJ);revU 
CA, [1994] 2 All ER 685), Meridian 
Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v 
Securities Commission ([1995] 2 AC 
500) and Director General of Fair Trading
v Pioneer Concrete (UK) Ltd ([1995] 1 
AC 456; [1995] 1 All ER 135), have 
adopted a context-specific approach 
by considering persons who, 
regardless of their positions in the 
company hierarchy act on behalf of 
the company in specific transactions, 
as consequently the ones who 
represent the company's mind and 
will in that specific transaction.
On this basis, a company's mind 
and will is formulated as a context- 
specific concept. In view of the vast 
size and complex structure of firms 
and the huge number of transactions 
performed every day or every minute 
on behalf of a firm in the financial 
services industry, such a context- 
specific approach appears as a fair 
and possibly necessary mitigation of a 
stringent and inflexible rule which 
only causes dogmatic complications.
In any case, trying to attribute to 
some abstract company brain all the 
knowledge held by all agents' 
'departments' would lead to an 
absurdum, as on one hand it has now 
been admitted both from a dogmatic 
and from a practical and realistic 
point of view that the mind of a 
company is not a conceptual 
metaphor but the actual mind of its 
agents (and nobody in a firm could be 
in a position to know practically 
everything), while on the other hand 
such a collective attribution would be 
inconsistent with the context-specific 
approach, which in terms of 
corporate liability requires the 
company mind to be that of the 
person carrying out the specific 
transaction on behalf of the company.
So far, the concept of split 
company knowledge or departmental 
company knowledge has not been 
legally endorsed. In the Court ofo J
Appeal decision in HRH Prince Jefri 
Bolkiah v KPMG (The Times, 22 
October, 1998), Eord Justice Waller 
correctly remarked that there would 
simply be no reason for examining 
Chinese walls and their effectiveness, 
if knowledge of one partner is to be 
imputed to another, thereby placing 
the other under an embargo from
acting. Such an admission by Lord 
Justice Waller, if considered in 
connection with the key admissions 
of case law in respect of the concept 
of attribution of knowledge, makes 
quite obvious the need for a 
reconciliation between the rigid,o '
single corporate mind concept and 
the need for a legal concept that will 
formalise (and legalise) what is 
practically achieved by an adequately 
operating Chinese wall: the actual 
division of corporate knowledge, the 
separation of information between 
separately operating departments and 
indeed the concept of split or 
departmental corporate knowledge.
The above seems to be in line with 
the current regulatory position under 
Core Rule 36.3, which, as already 
analysed, virtually introduces a 
presumption that the firm will not be 
taken to act in knowledge when none 
of its employees involved on behalf of 
it, acts with knowledge.' o
I think that in this respect the 
Conduct of Business Rules actually 
endorse a form of split or 
departmental knowledge by way of a 
presumption which in some way 
bypasses the application of the 
aforementioned rigid principles of 
common law, but nevertheless 
operates only in relation to particular 
other Core rules. In any case, by their 
regulatory nature, the Conduct of 
Business Rules cannot actually resolve 
the problem of attribution of 
knowledge which does, in my 
opinion, have to be addressed 
through statutory provisions of the 
new FSMA.
Adequacy of the Chinese wall
Before we look at case law on the 
adequacy of the Chinese wall we have 
to remark that the main bulk of 
relevant Commonwealth case law is 
limited to cases involving law firms 
and just a few cases of accounting 
firms, while no investment bank cases 
have attracted any serious attention 
on the matter so far.
One should always keep in mind in 
connection with law firm cases that
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in view of the special nature of the 
lawyer-to-client relationship and the 
position of the solicitor as an officer 
of the court, the approach of courts 
to the concept of Chinese walls in the 
law firm context has been fairly strict.
Indeed a significant degree of 
scepticism characterises the courts' 
views on how acceptable it may be to 
allow law firms to act in situations of 
conflict by representing clients with 
directly or even potentially conflicting 
interests and whether a Chinese wall 
can efficiently protect the 
confidentiality of information within 
the same firm and thus preserve the 
impartiality of action of the firm.
The caution and scepticism with 
which Commonwealth courts have 
consistently approached the concept 
of resolution of a conflict of interest 
situation in a law firm through theo
adoption of a Chinese wall is 
demonstrated by a variety of 
expressions referring to the wall, 
such as:
'a scheme which would offend against 
established principle and indeed the public 
interests in the proper administration of 
justice' (Mallesons Stephens Jacques v 
KPMG Peat Marwick [1990] WAR 
357)
'the law has a strong policy of insuring 
that solicitors do not have actual or 
apparent conflicts of interest in order to 
obtain public confidence in the 
administration of justice'. [QUOTE] 
(Carindale Country Club Estate Pty Ltd v 
Astill[\991] 115 ALR 112)
In Supasave Retail v Coward Chance in 
1991, the court appeared sufficiently 
sceptical towards the efficiency of the 
Chinese wall to remark that 'once the 
possession of confidential 
information by a firm of solicitors has 
been established, the erection of a 
Chinese wall will be regarded as 
inadequate protection for the 
interests of the former client', noting 
that there is always an element of 
seepage of confidential information 
in a firm or a group through casual 
chatter and discussion. (David Lee &_
Co (Lincoln) Ltd v Coward Chance and 
Ors; Supasave Retail Ltd v Coward Chance 
(a Firm) and Ors [1991] Ch 259; 
[1990] 3 WLR (2) 1278; [1991] 1 
All ER 668.) ^
Besides, in 1992 the court refused 
to accept the mere existence of a 
Chinese wall as a sufficient condition 
for the satisfaction of the 
confidentiality requirement; the 
judge expressed his strong 
reservations as to whether an 
impregnable Chinese wall could ever 
be created and added that only in 
very special cases should any attempt 
should be made to do so (Re a firm of 
Solicitors [1992] 1 All ER 353).
A more modest and tolerant 
approach to the adequacy of the 
Chinese wall was formed in the more 
recent decision of the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal in Russell McVeagh v 
Tower Corporation (Russell McVeagh 
McKenzie Batlett v Tower Corporation, 
New Zealand Court of Appeal, 
27.09.1998) in which the court 
formed an efficiency test which looks 
at the particular circumstances of the 
specific context in order to identify 
whether an unacceptable risk of 
communication of confidential 
information exists.
The court adopted a test based on 
three questions in particular:
  whether confidential information is 
held which, if disclosed, may affect 
the former clients interests;
  whether there is a real or 
appreciable risk that such 
information will be disclosed ;and
  whether the discretionary power of 
the court to intervene should be 
exercised in view of the significance 
of the special fiduciary 
relationship.
Before we turn to the approach 
adopted in Prince Jefri, we should 
reiterate that in view of the special 
nature of the solicitor's position, the 
courts should be very cautious in 
adopting the principles formulated in 
law firm cases to different contexts, 
such as that of financial services.
It is a fact that, so far, the 
authorities on the issue of the 
adequacy of the Chinese wall are 
limited to the law firm context. 
However, a direct transfer of 
principles applicable to law firms to a 
different context such as that of an 
investment bank or an accountingo
firm could give rise to problems oi 
inconsistency. The difficulty involved 
in applying solicitors' Chinese walls 
precedents to different contexts 
becomes obvious to the reader of the 
Prince Jefri decisions, looking at the 
number of the authorities considered 
and the court's approach to their 
construction and their application in 
the specific case. Setting aside the 
long analysis of precedents, in both 
the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords decisions, I shall attempt to 
examine the core of the rationale of 
the decisions.
In my opinion, the fundamental 
question on the basis of which the 
Prince Jefri case was judged was 
whether and to what extent the 
measures taken by KPMG to protect 
the confidential information 
possessed could be considered in the 
particular case as adequate to protect 
its confidentiality.
It should be emphasised that this 
question was placed in concrete in 
view of the adequacy of the particular 
Chinese wall that was adopted by 
KPMG in this specific case. Indeed 
the Court of Appeal considered the 
specific arrangements as adequate to 
protect the confidential information 
by adopting the Russell v Tower 
Corporation test of three questions 
stated above. On the other hand, 
their Lordships rejected the Tower test 
and were of the view that the specific 
measures taken by KPMG were not in 
the particular case adequate to 
preserve the confidentiality of 
information.
The decision of the Court of 
Appeal does not leave any doubt as to 
the court's views on the adequacy of 
the Chinese wall, given the fact that 
the court expressed its satisfaction 
that the wall was sufficiently adequate 25
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to ensure that there was no real or 
appreciable risk of inadvertent 
disclosure of information.
On the other hand, although the' o
House of Lords granted the 
injunction and restrained KPMG 
from acting in a situation of potential 
conflict, it did so not on the grounds 
that the Chinese wall is generally 
an ineffective means of 
compartmentalisation, but because 
the particular measures arranged by 
KPMG in the specific case were 
considered inadequate. May I note at 
this point that the ruling in the more 
recent case of Young v Robson Rhodes 
([1993] 3 All ER 524) affirmed this 
reading of the House of Lordso
decision.
Indeed, according to Lord Millett, 
the adequacy of the 'Project Lucy 
Wall' (as KPMG called its own 
Chinese wall) was undermined by 
various facts, such as the following:7 o
(1) The fact that the Project Lucy 
Wall was established ad hoc, 
only when KPMG undertook 
this specific project and in 
knowledge of the conflict and 
the risk of communication of 
information between its two 
teams working in conflicting 
projects. On this I should 
express my disagreement with 
the reading of Lord Millett's 
view by Mr Justice Luddie in the 
Robson Rhodes decision, whereby 
the latter thought that Lordo
Millett said that:
'all that matters is whether the wall 
works and not whether it was 
erected before — as part ojthejirm's 
Jabric — or at the very instance of 
the problem'.
I would tend to think that Lord 
Millett wanted to clarify that
when a wall is erected ad hoc 
this is a consideration leading to 
increased risk of disclosure of 
confidential information.
(2) The wall operated within one 
single department. This does 
not generally accord with the 
traditional concept of the wall 
being an establishment which 
separates different departments 
of the same establishment The 
bibliography on Chinese walls 
tends to agree as to the limited 
adequacy of a Chinese wall 
operating within one single 
department, in view of the 
apparent technical and 
procedural difficulties in 
separating teams within the 
same department, within a 
culture of people who are used 
to working together, co- 
operating and seeking each 
others' advice on everyday issues 
of work, and, after all, the 
inevitable risk of everyday 
communication and casual chat.
(3) It was established that a number 
of KPMG's employees had 
actually worked with both of the 
teams that were working on the 
conflicting projects and had thus 
effectively been transferred over 
the wall.
I would disagree with several 
commentators who have argued that 
Prince Jefri has not brought significant 
changes as far as the adequacy of the 
Chinese wall is concerned. My 
personal view is that the importance 
of the case is dual. On the one hand, 
the concept of the Chinese wall was 
for the first time judicially endorsed 
as an effective means of legal defence 
in connection with breach of 
fiduciary duties, as both the decision 
of the Court of Appeal directly, as
well as the decision of the House of 
Lords indirectly by argumentum a 
contrario, endorse the concept 
of a permanently-established and 
properly-operating Chinese wall that 
effectively separates different 
departments of a firm. On the other 
hand, in the House of Lords decision, 
Lord Millett actually considered 
industry standards as to the proper 
construction and operation of the 
Chinese wall within a firm, giving an 
indication that the adequacy of a 
Chinese wall can and will be 
evaluated on the basis of certain 
standards crystallised in practice 
within a specific industry.
Efficiency as a legal defence
The question of whether the new 
Financial Services and Markets Act 
should provide specific guidance as to 
the proper construction and 
operation of the Chinese wall in 
order for it to be accepted by the 
courts as an effective means of legal 
defence is an issue that requires 
significant consultation with the 
financial services industry.
My own view is that the FSMA 
should endorse the Chinese wall as an 
efficient legal defence, by referring 
the evaluation of its practical 
adequacy to clearly set and 
identifiable standards, formulated in 
accordance with the practice of the 
financial services industry and 
incorporated in the new core conduct 
of business rules to be drafted further 
to the enactment of the act. ®
George Barboutis
Shearman &^Sterliny
Addendum
In the article by Olosuji Elias entitled 'The impact of globalisation on human rights', Amicus Curiae, Issue 28, June 2000, 
pp. 19 23, the reference to Globalization and the Postmodern Turn on p. 23 should read: 'http://wvwv.gseis.uc/ at p. 2'.
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